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Zvika Neeman, Aniko Öry, Jungju Yu†
April 4, 2018
Abstract
We study a model of reputation with two long-lived firms that sell their products
under a collective brand or under two different individual brands. Firms face a moral
hazard problem because their quality investments are not observed. Investments can
only be sustained due to reputational concerns. In a collective brand, consumers cannot
distinguish between the two firms. We show that in the long run, this makes it harder
to establish a good reputation because of the incentives to free-ride on the other firm’s
investments. But in the short run it mitigates the temptation to milk good reputation.
Consequently, a collective brand can provide stronger incentives to invest in quality
if firms are sufficiently impatient. We explain the connection between incentives and
the type of industry in which the firms operate as captured by the underlying signal
structure and consumers’ prior beliefs. We discuss the relation to country-of-origin
labelling, agricultural cooperatives, and other collective brands.
1 Introduction
Firms make substantial investments to build strong brands. The American Marketing As-
sociation defines a brand as “a name ... that identifies one seller’s good ... as distinct from
those of other sellers.”1 Sometimes, a number of firms sell their products under a shared
name or a collective brand that carries a collective reputation shaped by the firms who use
∗We thank Joyee Deb, Anthony Dukes, Johannes Hörner, Larry Samuelson, Jiwoong Shin, K. Sudhir,
Robert Zeithammer for helpful comments. We also thank seminar participants at McGill University, the
FTC and Marketing Science economic conference on consumer protection, the SICS conference at Berkeley,
the University of Munich, and Yale University.
†Neeman: Tel Aviv University (e-mail: zvika@post.tau.ac.il). Öry: Yale School of Management (e-mail:
aniko.oery@yale.edu). Yu: Yale School of Management (e-mail: jungju.yu@yale.edu).
1https://www.ama.org/resources/pages/dictionary.aspx
the name. For example, a bottle of wine carries an appellation, such as Bordeaux or Cham-
pagne, which applies to many producers in the same region. Many lay consumers cannot
distinguish among the names of individual producers and rely on appellations to make their
purchase decisions. Country of origin labelling serves a similar function. For example, Volk-
swagen advertises “the power of German engineering” and Swiss watchmakers, even the ones
with strong individual brands, emphasize that their watches are “Swiss made.”
Both individual and collective brands are means to build a good reputation. When build-
ing reputation, a firm faces a moral hazard problem; its investment in quality is unobservable
to current consumers, and the reputational return on its investment can only be collected
in the future. In this paper, we study how sustaining reputation in a collective brand is
different from that of an individual brands.2
At first glance, collective brands may seem like a bad idea. If several firms operate
under one brand name, each firm has an incentive to free-ride on other firms’ investments.
Moreover, a firm’s investment in its own quality has a weaker effect on the brand value
of a collective brand because consumers are uncertain about the relationship between the
collective brand’s reputation and the specific firm they interact with. In other words, the
“precision” of the signal that is generated by a firm’s investment in quality is lower in a
collective brand, which weakens the incentive to invest in quality.
Nevertheless, under some circumstances, a collective reputation can serve as a commit-
ment device for investment in high quality. If a brand is very successful (possibly as a result
of previous large investments), then a firm might be discouraged from additional investment
because the returns from it become small. Such a firm might become complacent or rest on
its laurels, so to speak. Analogously, if a brand develops a bad reputation (possibly as a
result of no investment), then returns on investment are also low, and the firm might give up
investment altogether. Collective brands can mitigate these “discouragement effects” faced
by individual firms after very good or very bad histories by making extreme beliefs about the
value of the brand less likely. We describe circumstances where this benefit of a collective
brand outweighs the benefits of individual brands.
To compare the two branding regimes, we extend a model of reputation in the vein
of Mailath and Samuelson (2001).3 In our model, two (or more) long lived firms make
investment decision over time. Firms’ investments are unobservable to consumers. There
2Of course, in practical situations firms are endowed with features of both individual and collective
brands. For example, Volkswagen has a strong individual brand, and at the same time belongs to the group
of German auto makers. For simplicity, we abstract away from such hybrid situations and focus on pure
collective and individual brands in order the present the difference between individual and collective brands
in the starkest possible terms.
3Mailath and Samuelson (2001) consider the case of a single firm (and individual reputation). We consider
two or more firms that may sell their products under an individual or a collective brand.
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are two types of firms, competent and incompetent. Only the competent type has the option
to make a costly investment. Consumers observe past quality levels, which are noisy signals
of past investment decisions.
The key distinction between an individual and a collective brand lies in consumers’ ob-
servation of past quality realizations. Consumers observe a firm-specific record under an
individual brand, and a group-specific record under a collective brand. This has two im-
plications. First, each signal produced by a collective brand is a noisier signal about each
firm than an individual brand’s signal. In particular, consumers remain uncertain about
each firm’s types because they are unaware of which firm produced the signal. Second, a
collective brand generates more signals than an individual brand because each one of its
members can produce a signal.
We focus on the most efficient equilibrium in which a competent type always makes an
investment. We call this equilibrium the Reputational Equilibrium. We examine whether
it is easier for an individual or a collective brand to sustain this reputational equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, a firm’s reputation is given by consumers’ posterior beliefs about the
competence of the brand’s members. Consumers are willing to pay more for a good that
is produced by a brand with better past outcomes. Therefore, the reputational equilibrium
exists if and only if a competent type’s expected return from investment is larger than the
investment cost after each possible history.
An investment generates both short-run and long-run benefits. In the short-run, a firm
may want to exploit its current reputation if it has already reached a very good reputation.
In such a case, additional investment yields only a modest improvement to reputation, which
may be insufficient to justify the cost. A collective brand can improve investment incentives
in the short-run because its noisier signals prevent its reputation from becoming so good.
Hence, a member of a collective brand is more motivated to contribute to its reputation.
However, in the long-run, a member of a collective brand may be tempted to free-ride on
efforts by other members of the brand. So, in the long-run, a collective brand provides less
investment incentives than an individual brand. It follows that when short-run incentives
are more important, then a collective brand provides stronger incentives to invest than an
individual brand.4
Moreover, we show that a collective brand is more likely to thrive in markets that re-
quire specialized knowledge in order to produce high quality products, such as markets for
expensive wine, watches, and cars. In such markets, an individual firm can quickly attain
an excellent reputation as an individual brand, which is bad for incentives. This effect
is especially pronounced if firms are very likely to possess the required specialized knowl-
4As shown in Section 4, in some circumstances this result holds even if firms are infinitely patient.
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edge ex-ante, which is more likely in developed economies. If, however, the market consists
mostly of incompetent firms who lack this specialized knowledge, as would be the case in
a developing economy, then we show that individual brands provide stronger incentives for
investment.
We show that the benefits from the additional commitment power that is provided by a
collective brand can be large enough so as to induce a competent firm to form a collective
brand with an incompetent firm. In such a case, the socially optimal branding regime
coincides with firms’ optimal choice, so no regulation is required. However, it is also possible
that a competent firm would prefer an individual to a collective brand, even though the
latter induces incentives to invest while the former does not. In such cases, regulation that
promotes collective brands improves overall efficiency.
Collective reputation building is also relevant in other domains. Any good that is pur-
chased online is essentially an “experience good” whose quality cannot be ascertained by
consumers at the time of purchase (Nelson (1970)).5 Nosko and Tadelis (2015) show that a
consumer who has a bad experience with one seller in an online platform such as eBay or
Amazon, is less likely to buy through that platform again, which is evidence of a “reputa-
tional externality” that sellers in the platform exert over one another. Such a reputational
externality is characteristic of a collective brand. Yet another example for the reputational
externality that is produced by collective reputation is provided by organizations that require
their members to wear uniforms, such as the Police, military forces, Girl and Boy Scouts,
etc. Uniforms foster the creation of a reputational externality among their wearers because
they blur individual identities.6
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the related literature.
In Section 3 we present the model, define the equilibrium concept, and introduces the key
distinction between an individual and a collective brand in terms of consumers’ beliefs. In
Section 4 we describe circumstances under which an individual or a collective brand provides
stronger incentives for investments. In Section 5, we examine a competent type’s brand
formation decision, and consider whether it would want to form a collective brand with an
incompetent firm. In Section 6 we present extensions of the basic model that allow for longer
memory and more than two firms, respectively. All proofs are relegated to Appendices.
5Experience goods also include nondurables such as wine, durables such as appliances and cars, and many
service providers such as lawyers, doctors, and mechanics.
6Stereotypes provide yet another example.
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2 Related Literature
Our work is related to the theoretical economics literature on reputation in markets for
experience goods, as well as to the literature on umbrella branding, country-of-origin and
career concerns.
The idea that reputational concerns can help a firm to produce high quality even though
consumers are unable to verify the quality of an experience good (Nelson (1970)) goes back
to Klein and Leffler (1981). The subsequent literature has explored the implications of this
argument and has argued that it must contend with two major difficulties: the first is that
for it to be sustainable, reputation must generate profits, and it is not clear how this is
possible in a competitive environments where profits are driven down to zero.7 The second
difficulty, which has been famously noted by Holmström (1999), is that in the long run, the
firm would develop an excellent reputation for quality. Any observation of low quality would
thus be attributed to bad luck and would therefore not affect prices, with the consequence
that the firm’s incentives to continue to exert the costly effort necessary to produce high
quality would be destroyed.
Several elegant solutions to these difficulties were offered. Hörner (2002) noted that
if consumers can observe the consumer bases of firms in the market, then a firm may be
discouraged from producing low quality for fear of losing its consumer base (see also Fedele
and Tedeschi (2014)). Mailath and Samuelson (2001) formulated the insight that individual
reputation can be sustained if consumers’ beliefs about the type of the firm are bounded away
from one, as would be the case if the firm’s type is drawn afresh in every period, in a way
that is unobservable to consumers. In this paper, we assume instead that consumers have
finite memories as in Moav and Neeman (2010) and Liu and Skrzypacz (2014). This allows
us to solve for the threshold cost below which firms invest in quality, which is intractable in
Mailath and Samuelson (2001)’s model.
Using this framework we are able to show that acting as a collective can help to sustain
high reputation. The mechanism is related to the one studied by Bar-Isaac (2007) who
considers an overlapping generations model in the moral hazard-in-teams (career concerns)
framework developed by Holmström (1999). He shows that senior entrepreneurs who sell the
firm in the next period have an incentive to exert effort and work with young juniors who
themselves also need to build a good reputation.
Research that identifies the benefits of collective reputation is scarce. Tirole (1993) is
probably the first who formalized an analytical model of collective reputation in context of
7See, e.g., Kranton (2003). In our model we abstract away from this difficulty by assuming that firms
make take-it-or-leave-it price offers to consumers, but our results would continue to hold as long as firms
capture at least some of the surplus that is generated by their transactions with consumers.
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a large organization. In Tirole’s model, a group’s reputation is an aggregate of the repu-
tations of the individual members of the group. As is the case in models with statistical
discrimination, there can be different steady states equilibria, and in particular one with
“low corruption” and another with “high corruption”.8 As in his model, we do not require
a common trait of group members, but unlike in Tirole (1993) our focus is on the moral
hazard problem and the “brand management” rather than on statistical steady state infer-
ences. Thus, our model is more relevant for long-lived firms as decision makers rather than
individuals being assigned different tasks.
More recently, Fishman et al. (2014) consider a two-period model in which an individual
firm can only generate one signal per period. A collective brand that includes many firms
can send many signals and so provide better information to consumers. This informational
benefit outweighs firms’ incentive to free-ride on other firms’ investment efforts provided
the number of brand members is not too large.9 This model abstracts away from issues of
commitment and dynamic trade-offs, which are the focus of our analysis. 10 Notably, unlike
Bar-Isaac (2007), Tirole (1993), and Fishman et al. (2014), our focus is to compare collective
to individual reputation building.
Collective reputation has also been studied in the context of umbrella branding in which
an existing brand name is extended to a new product line, and thus the brand reputation
is formed by performance of its multiple products. Wernerfelt (1988), Choi (1998), Cabral
(2000), Miklós-Thal (2012), and Moorthy (2012) have examined the incentives that a mo-
nopolist has to signal quality by pooling reputation for different products. In a setting of
moral hazard with consumers’ perfect monitoring of product quality Andersson (2002) and
Hakenes and Peitz (2008) show that umbrella branding always provides stronger investment
incentives as one deviation puts both markets at risk. Yu (2017) examines the extent of
risk sharing across product markets as a function of relatedness between markets and shows
that independent branding can be a disciplinary device if the relatedness is too high. Others
have considered settings where free-riding incentives are more pronounced. Zhang (2015)
examines country-of-origin labeling. He shows that the ability to free-ride on other firms’
quality investments implies that high quality firms have an incentive to dissociate them-
selves from the country-of-origin label, which in turn mitigates free-riding and can improve
the reputation for the group.
8Levin (2009) extends Tirole (1993) by considering the case where the cost of high effort evolves stochas-
tically over time.
9Indeed, Winfree and McCluskey (2005) claim that the large number of apple growers in Washington,
contributed to the decline in the quality of Washington apples during the 1990s.
10Fleckinger (2016) considers collective reputation under Cournot competition where consumers only learn
the average quality in the market. He studies the effect of the number of firms on welfare, and shows that
quality is decreasing in the number of firms whereas quantity increases.
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3 Model and Definitions
3.1 Model
Our model captures the following type of scenario:11
Two drivers, Adam and Brian, work for New Haven Limo Services, a com-
pany that provides limousine services. Every day, a customer who needs the
service calls the company and is (randomly) assigned to an available driver. The
customer observes the reviews posted by the previous customers and pays to the
driver before the service is provided. After the ride, the customer posts a review
on the quality of the service on the company’s website. A competent driver can
improve the ride experience through the exertion of costly effort; an incompetent
driver cannot.
The limo service can decide whether to reveal or conceal the names of the
drivers in the posted reviews. In the former case, customers can check the past
records of individual drivers. So, each driver establishes an individual reputation.
In the latter case, customers cannot distinguish between the two drivers’ records.
So, the drivers establish a collective reputation.
More formally, we consider a market with two firms that produce a vertically differenti-
ated experience good, that can be of either good (G) or bad (B) quality, at zero cost. In
every period, t ∈ {. . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . }, one short-lived consumer with unit demand arrives and
is randomly matched with one of the firms.
Firms. Each firm is competent (C) with probability µ ∈ (0, 1), or incompetent (I)
with probability 1 − µ. The two firms’ types θ ∈ {C, I} are independently drawn from the
same publicly known distribution. The two firms’ realized types become known to the firms,
but not to consumers. A competent firm that is matched with a consumer can make an
investment at cost c > 0 to improve the quality of the good it produces in that period:
investment yields a good quality (G) with probability πH while non investment yields good
quality with probability πL < πH . An incompetent firm cannot invest and produces good
quality with probability πL.
Consumers. Consumers do not observe the firms’ investment decisions, but they do
observe the quality of goods produced in the last two periods.12 Consumers update their
beliefs about the type of the firm they are matched with. After its investment decision,
11We thank Robert Zeithammer for suggesting this example.
12In Section 6.1, we extend the model to any finite number of periods of observation larger than two.
6
the matched firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the consumer.13 The consumer either
accepts or rejects the firm’s offer and then leaves the market.
Payoffs. We normalize the payoff of a consumer who does not buy the good to 0. A
consumer who buys the good at a price p receives a payoff of 1 − p if the good is of good
quality, and −p otherwise. A firm that sells in period t at price pt enjoys a payoff of vt = pt−c
at t if it invests at t, and vt = pt if it does not. A firm that does not sell in any given period
obtains a payoff of 0 in that period. Firms discount their future payoffs by δ ∈ [0, 1).
Branding Regimes. In a collective brand, or if the two firms sustain their reputation
collectively, consumers cannot distinguish between the identities of the two firms. This
means that consumers obtain a signal about the collective in every period, regardless of
which firm they are matched with. Thus, the set of relevant histories for a collective brand
is Hcol = {G,B}2. In contrast, if firms maintain an individual reputation or form individual
brands, then consumers can distinguish between them. Consequently, consumers observe
the quality produced in the last two periods by the firm they have been matched. Thus, the
set of relevant histories for an individual brand is Hind = {G,B,∅}2 where ∅ represents a
failure to match.
We denote a history at time t by ht ≡ ht−2ht−1 ∈ Hb (b ∈ {ind, col}) where ht−n denotes
the quality of the good produced in period t− n. Notice that the matching process ensures
that the two firms sell the same expected quantity under the two regimes, but at possibly
different prices .
Equilibrium. We focus on stationary equilibria in which strategies depend only on the
relevant histories specified above. A stationary equilibrium is defined by an investment and
pricing strategy of firms, a purchasing strategy of consumers, and consumers’ beliefs over
the set of firm’s types. For simplicity, we assume that consumers purchase the good when
indifferent.
3.2 Beliefs and Signal Structure
Posterior beliefs. In the case of an individual brand, posterior beliefs given a history
ht ∈ Hind are given by the probability Prind(C|ht) that the firm the consumer is matched
with is competent.
In the case of a collective reputation or brand, posterior beliefs are given by a probability
distribution over the pairs of types of the two firms. We denote the posterior belief that the
two firms’ types are s ∈ {C, I}2 given history ht ∈ Hcol by ηs(ht). The posterior belief that
13This assumption implies that all surplus goes to the firm in equilibrium, which simplifies the analysis.
Firms must receive some surplus for reputation to be desirable.
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the matched firm is competent given a history ht is
Prcol(C|ht) = ηCC(ht) +
1
2
(ηCI(ht) + ηIC(ht)). (1)
The reputation of a brand – both individual and collective – corresponds to the two pos-
terior beliefs Prind(C|ht) and Prcol(C|ht), respectively. In equilibrium, each player’s strategy
maximizes its payoffs given other players’ strategies and beliefs. Posterior beliefs are derived
from the realized histories and the firms’ strategies by Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
For most of the paper we focus on the stationary equilibrium in which competent firms
invest in quality whenever they are matched with a consumer, after each and every history
and independently of the other firm’s type. We call this the reputational equilibrium. In
such an equlibrium, upon observing a history ht, a consumer is willing to pay a price
pb(ht) = Pr
b(C|ht) · πH + (1− Prb(C|ht)) · πL, (2)
where b ∈ {ind, col}. Thus, this is also the reputational equilibrium price.
The reputational equilibrium is socially optimal if (and only if)
∆π ≡ πH − πL ≥ c, (3)
which we assume to be satisfied throughout the paper.
The game also has other stationary equilibria. For example, a “no investment” equilib-
rium, in which a competent firm never invests in quality, always exists. We discuss other
stationary equilibria in Section 5 where we discuss endogenous brand formation.
When we compare the incentives induced by collective versus individual brands, it is
useful to focus on two types of signal structures that are easy to interpret and that highlight
the benefit of collective reputation:
1. “Exclusive knowledge” (πL = 0, πH ∈ (0, 1)): In this case, a firm cannot produce a
good outcome without making an investment. Consequently, the observation of good
quality reveals competence. Such a signal structure fits industries in which some special
technology or expertise is required in order to produce high quality products, such as
in watches, automobiles, electronics, etc.
2. “Quality control” (πH = 1, πL ∈ (0, 1)): In this case, a competent firm that invests
is guaranteed a good outcome. Consequently, observation of bad quality (in the rep-
utational equilibrium) reveals incompetence. Such a signal structure fits industries in
8
which consistency is required in order to produce high quality products, such as in
manufacturing or service industries.
Throughout the paper, we formulate all of our results for the case of exclusive knowledge,
and mention the analogous results for the case of quality control in remarks. Note that by
continuity, all of our results hold also in the cases where πL is sufficiently close to zero and
the value of πH is held fixed (exclusive knowledge) and πH is sufficiently close to one and πL
is held fixed (quality control), respectively.
4 Reputational Equilibrium
In this section, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the repu-
tational equilibrium, which is also the most efficient equilibrium, under the two branding
regimes. We show that a reputational equilibrium exists if and only if the investment cost c
is smaller than or equal to a threshold cost c̄b, b ∈ {ind, col}, that depends on the branding
regime. Then, we identify which branding regime sustains the reputational equilibrium for
a larger set of costs c by comparing these two threshold costs. The branding regime with
the higher threshold cost c̄b is said to induce stronger incentives to invest.
4.1 Individual Brand
In a reputational equilibrium, a competent firm invests after every possible history. There-
fore, in such an equilibrium, after every history ht the consumer that is matched with the
firm updates her posterior belief about the firm’s type and computes her willingness to pay
pind(ht). The firm invests in quality after a history ht if its expected return from investment,
taking into account the effect of this investment on the consumers’ future willingness to pay,
is greater than its cost. The next proposition characterizes the threshold cost of investment
above which investment is not worthwhile.
Proposition 1. The reputational equilibrium exists for an individual brand if and only if
the cost of investment c is such that
c ≤ c̄ind ≡ min
ht−1∈{G,B,∅}
c̄ind(ht−1)
where c̄ind(ht−1) denotes the expected benefit from investment after history ht = ht−2ht−1.
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The function c̄ind(ht−1) is given by







ht+1∈{G,B,∅} Pr(ht+1) · (p
ind(Ght+1)− pind(Bht+1))
] (4)
where Pr(ht+1) denotes the probability distribution of the outcome realized in period t + 1
(Pr(G) = πH
2
, Pr(B) = 1−πH
2
, and Pr(∅) = 1
2
).
Notice that the threshold cost c̄ind is the sum of expected short-run and long-run price
premia that arise from investment, as explained below. It is important to note that all
these price premia can be explicitly expressed as a function of the parameters of the model,
which include the prior belief µ, and the probabilities πH and πL.
14 We relegate the explicit
expression to the Appendix A because it is lengthy and not insightful in itself.
The firm’s investment in period t increases the probability of producing a good outcome
at t and this will be observed by the consumer that is matched with the firm in the next
two periods t + 1 and t + 2. Upon observing ht = G, such a consumer would be willing to
pay more than if it observed ht = B. So, the threshold cost is given by the sum of expected
price premiums in the following two periods. The differences in expected price premiums in
periods t+ 1 and t+ 2 induce short-run and long-run incentives to invest, respectively.
In the short-run, a consumer that is matched with the firm in period t + 1 observes
a history ht+1 = ht−1ht. So, by investing in period t, the firm enjoys a price premium
pind(ht−1G) − pind(ht−1B). This premium is small if the firm has a very good or very bad
reputation following the history ht−1. For example, in the exclusive knowledge environment
(πL = 0, πH ∈ (0, 1), µ ∈ (0, 1)), following history ht−1 = G, a consumer’s posterior belief is
updated to Prind(C|ht−1ht) = 1. T hus, for ht−1 = G, the short-run price premium vanishes,
or pind(ht−1G)− pind(ht−1B) = 0.15 This illustrates the difficulty of inducing a commitment
to invest through short-run incentives for an individual brand. An individual brand can
develop a very good reputation through investment, but it is then tempted to exploit its
reputation.
In the long-run, the consumer that is matched with the firm in period t + 2 no longer
observes the original history (ht). Instead, she observes ht+2 = htht+1. In the reputational
equilibrium a competent type invests in all periods following t if matched with a consumer.
So, an investment at t also generates a long-run price premium pind(Ght+1) − pind(Bht+1).
If ht+1 is equal to G with a high probability, then the firm would be tempted to rely on
14This is because reputational equilibrium probabilities and prices can be explicitly calculated for every




and then pind(GG) can be calculated using (2). The
other probabilities and prices can be similarly calculated.
15More specifically, by equation (2), pind(GG)− pind(GB) = πH · (Prind(C|GG)− Prind(C|GB)) = 0.
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its future equilibrium investments, which would hurt its incentives to invest. However, in
the case of an individual brand, the firm would not be matched with a consumer in period
t+ 1 with probability 1
2
, and in this case ht+1 = ∅. This long-run consideration may provide
sufficient discipline for an individual brand to invest at t.
Figure 1: The Cutoff Levels for Independent Branding for πH = 0.975, πL = 0.025, δ = 0.9
To completely characterize the threshold c̄ind, we need to take the minimum of c̄ind(ht−1)
over all histories ht−1 ∈ Hind. Figure 1 depicts c̄ind(ht−1) as a function of the prior probability
that a firm is competent, µ. As expected, the threshold vanishes at µ = 0 and µ = 1 because
in these cases consumers’ beliefs are unaffected by observed history so the price premiums
associated with investment are zero. Obviously, in these cases the firm cannot be induced
to invest.
Figure 1 also depicts the history on which c̄ind is attained. It shows that for a large µ,
c̄ind = c̄ind(G), that is, the firm faces the weakest incentive to invest after a good outcome.
This is because observation of a good outcome pushes posterior beliefs further up, which
tempts the firm to milk its good reputation. For a low value of µ, c̄ind = c̄ind(B) because given
a pessimistic prior, the observation of a bad outcome pushes posterior beliefs further down,
which discourages the firm from investment because it doesn’t change beliefs sufficiently
anyway.
The next Lemma shows that this observation is true also more generally.
Lemma 1. If µ is sufficiently large, or
µ ≥ πL(1− πL)
πH(1− πH) + πL(1− πL)
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then c̄ind = c̄ind(G). Otherwise, c̄ind = c̄ind(B).
4.2 Collective Brand
If the two firms form a collective brand, then consumers observe the performance history
of the collective brand ht ∈ Hcol = {G,B}2 without being able to distinguish whether it
was produced by the particular firm with which they have been matched, or the other firm
in the collective brand. Compared to an individual brand, the history of a collective brand
provides a noisier signal about firms’ types, but unlike in the case of an individual brand in
which a firm may fail to match and produce an outcome in any given period, a collective
brand produces an outcome or signal is produced in every period. Specifically, the consumer
forms beliefs over the types of the two firms, s ∈ {C, I}2, denoted ηs(ht), which allow her to
compute beliefs about the competence of the firm that are given by:




Then consumer then determines her willingness to pay, pcol(ht), according to equation (2).
The general approach for the characterization of the reputational equilibrium under a
collective brand is similar to the approach for individual brand. We state the result for a
collective brand in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. A reputational equilibrium exists for a collective brand if and only if the
cost of investment c is such that
c ≤ c̄col ≡ min
ht−1∈{G,B}, θ∈{C,I}
c̄col(ht−1, θ)
where c̄col(ht−1, θ) denotes the expected benefit from investment after history ht = ht−2ht−1 if
the other firm is of type θ ∈ {C, I} and is given by












where Pr(ht+1|θ) denotes the probability distribution over the realized outcome in period t+1.
If the other firm is competent, then Pr(G|C) = πH and Pr(B|C) = 1 − Pr(G|C). If it is
incompetent, then Pr(G|I) = πH+πH
2
and Pr(B|I) = 1− Pr(G|C).
As with an individual brand, the existence of a reputational equilibrium for a collective
brand is characterized by a threshold rule. The difference between the two cases stems from
the fact that in the case of a collective brand the investment incentives of a competent firm
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depend on the other firm’s investment. Accordingly, the threshold cost c̄col is the minimum
of ccol(ht−1, θ) over the history ht−1 ∈ {G,B} and the other firm’s type, θ ∈ {C, I}, which
is unobserved by consumers. As in the case of an individual brand, the function ccol(ht−1, θ)
can be expressed in terms of the primitives of the model, but since the resulting expression
is long, we relegate it to the Appendix A.
In the short-run, a competent firm in a collective brand expects a price premium of
pcol(ht−1G) − pcol(ht−1B) from investment that depends on the consumers’ prior belief µ,
and probabilities πH and πL. For example, in the case of exclusive knowledge described
above (πL = 0, πH ∈ (0, 1), and µ ∈ (0, 1)), upon observation of an outcome ht−1 = G, the
consumer learns that one firm in the collective is competent, but the type of the other firm
remains unknown. This implies that the firm has an incentive to invest even after a good
outcome in order to improve its reputation. In other words, pcol(ht−1G)− pcol(ht−1B) > 0.16
That is, consumers’ limited information about individual firms within the collective brand
mitigates each firm’s short-run Moral Hazard problem.
In the long-run, the firm’s investment in period t can contribute to its reputation in period
t+2. The price premium that is generated by investment is given by pcol(Ght+1)−pcol(Bht+1).
A collective brand produces an outcome in every period, regardless of which firm a consumer
visits. So, a firm may free-ride on its own as well as on the other firm’s future investment.
This results in weaker long-run incentives to invest in a collective brand compared to an
individual brand.
Notice that an individual brand faces a more severe commitment problem in the short-
run, while a collective brand faces a bigger problem in the long-run. This tradeoff plays a
central role in the comparison presented in the next subsection.
Figure 2 depicts the expected return from investment ccol(ht−1, θ) for each history ht−1 ∈
{G,B} and type θ ∈ {C, I} of the other firm. The solid line represents the threshold cost
c̄col, which is given by the minimum of ccol(ht−1, θ) over ht−1 ∈ {G,B} and θ ∈ {C, I}, as a
function of µ.
If consumers’ prior beliefs are very optimistic, then a competent member firm in a col-
lective brand faces a commitment problem because it has a reputation that is good enough
to exploit. This commitment problem is more severe after a good history ht−1 = G when
the firm expects the other firm to invest in the future (θ = C). Thus, for a large value of µ,
c̄col = ccol(G,C).
16Specifically, pcol(GG)− pcol(GB) = 3µ+12µ+2 −
1
2 > 0 and p




Figure 2: The Cutoff Levels for Collective Branding for πH = 0.975, πL = 0.025, δ = 0.9
If µ is small, then the firm does not invest because it becomes discouraged. This dis-
couragement becomes more severe after a bad history ht−1 = B if the firm expects the other
firm no not invest in the future (θ = I).
Lemma 2. For µ close to 1, c̄col = c̄col(G,C), and for µ close to 0, c̄col = c̄col(B, I).
4.3 Comparing Individual and Collective Brands
In this section, we examine the conditions under which a collective brand sustains the rep-
utational equilibrium on a larger set of investment costs than an individual brand. Other
equilibria are discussed in the next section. For simplicity, we focus on the case of exclusive
knowledge where πL = 0 and πH ∈ (0, 1). In this case, a good outcome G reveals competence,
which allows us to derive results that are easy to interpret.
The next proposition shows that in the case of exclusive knowledge, a collective brand
sustains the reputational equilibrium for a larger set of costs than an individual brand if the
discount factor δ is not too large. This is because as explained in the previous subsection, a
collective brand provides stronger short-run incentives than individual reputation.
Proposition 3. Suppose that πL = 0 and πH ∈ (0, 1). There exists a threshold discount
factor δ ∈ [0, 1] such that c̄col > c̄ind if and only if δ < δ. Moreover, if πH is sufficiently
large, then δ = 1, or c̄col > c̄ind for all δ ∈ [0, 1).
The fact that a collective brand induces stronger incentives to invest for all discount
factors δ < 1 if πH is sufficiently large is due to the fact that a higher πH implies that
signals are more accurate, which strengthens the incentive to milk reputation. We verify in
simulations that the critical threshold δ is increasing in πH .
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The magnitude of the short-run benefit that is provided by a collective brand depends
critically on the prior beliefs µ. In particular, in the case of exclusive knowledge, this
magnitude is larger if µ is large, or consumers are optimistic about firms’ competence. This
is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that πL = 0, πH ∈ (0, 1), and δ is not too large. Then, if µ is
sufficiently close to 1, then c̄col > c̄ind; if µ is close to 0, then c̄col < c̄ind.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Recall that for a large µ, consumers have
optimistic prior beliefs about each firm. This implies that an individual brand is more
tempted to exploit its reputation. However, consumers remain relatively more uncertain
about a collective brand because even after observation of a good outcome it is still possible
that the other firm in the collective is incompetent. Therefore, a firm in a collective brand
is relatively more motivated to invest.
If µ is small, then firms are concerned with building up reputation. This takes place over
time, which implies that firms’ long-run incentives become more important. Consequently,
individual reputation induces stronger incentives to invest.
Remark 1. (Quality control) In the case of quality control (πH = 1 and πL ∈ (0, 1)), a
competent always produces a good outcome as long as it makes an investment. So, given
the reputational equilibrium, a bad outcome reveals the firm’s incompetence. In this setting,
we can show that 1) c̄col > c̄ind if δ is not too large and µ is sufficiently close to 0, and 2)
c̄col < c̄ind if µ is sufficiently close to 1. In this environment, after producing bad outcomes,
an individual brand’s reputation plunges, which discouraged the firm from further investing.
However, a bad outcome for a collective brand is noisier information, as it proves incompe-
tence of one firm but the type of the other firm remains uncertain. As a result, a collective
brand’s reputation can be somewhat recovered by additional investments. In fact, the in-
sight that individual reputation provides stronger long-run incentives as well as numerical
simulations suggest this result holds for any signal structure.17
Figure 3 depicts the threshold costs for individual and collective reputation c̄ind and c̄col,
respectively. The higher is the threshold cost, the stronger is the incentive to invest. Figure 3
shows that for µ close to 1, a collective brand dominates individual brands, while the opposite
is true for µ close to 0. Proposition 3 implies that a collective brand is less attractive when
δ is large, but the discount factor used in Figure 3 is δ = 0.9, which shows that a collective
brand dominates individual brands for a rather large set of parameter values.
17See Online Appendix B.2. for a formal result for quality control case and its proof.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Cutoff Levels for πL = 0, πH = 0.93, δ = 0.9
Our observations seem to be consistent with observed practice. The parameter µ may
be interpreted as the baseline reputation of firms in the market, industry, or country. It is
reasonable to assume that firms in developed economies would have a better baseline reputa-
tion than those in developing economies. Furthermore, an exclusive knowledge environment
describes industries in which production requires an advanced technology or expertise, such
as advanced electronics, automobiles, watches, etc. In such industries, Proposition 4 implies
that collective brands would thrive in developed economies, but less so in developing ones.
Indeed, car manufacturers in Germany often emphasize their country of origin. In contrast,
in countries with lower baseline reputations, such as China and South Korea, firms try to
develop their individual brands, and sometimes even detach these individual brands from
their country of origin (see also Zhang (2015)).
5 Brand Formation
So far, we have examined each brand regime as exogenously given. This may be realistic in
some applications. For example, a country might require each local manufacturer to label
its country of origin. And producers of wine, cheese, and coffee may become part of an
appellation that is determined by their geographical location. However, in other examples
it is a firm’s strategic decision whether develop an individual or a collective brand. In this
section, we examine this decision.
The reason we cannot simply apply the results of the previous section is that the choice
between an individual and a collective brand provides information about firms’ types. For
example, a competent firm may form a collective brand if and only if the other firm is also
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competent. Moreover, from a welfare perspective, this analysis may generate implications
for regulation policy. Collective reputation is socially optimal if cost c is such that c̄col >
c > c̄ind. If, in this case, competent firms prefer to establish an individual rather than a
collective reputation brand, then regulation that requires firms to label their country-of-
origin or appellation more prominently may promote social welfare. However, we show that
at least in the case of exclusive knowledge where in addition the prior beliefs µ are sufficiently
strong, collective reputation induces a stronger commitment to invest exactly when it is also
more efficient, so no regulation is needed.
To analyze this question, we assume that firms make their branding decisions at the
beginning of the entire game that is described in Section 3. Specifically, after the types of
the two firms are determined, firms learn each other’s type and decide whether to operate
as an individual or collective brand.18 We analyze the best stationary equilibrium for each
branding decision, and compare firm’s profits in both.
We focus our attention on the more interesting case where a collective brand induces
stronger incentives to invest than an individual brand, or where cost c is such that c̄ind <
c < c̄col. In all other cases, individual reputation (weakly) dominates a collective reputation.
5.1 Stationary Equilibria
We first investigate which stationary equilibria exist when investment costs c are too high
for the reputational equilibrium to exist. Recall that the set of relevant histories for a brand
is given by Hb for b ∈ {ind, col}. A stationary equilibrium strategy specifies a mapping from
the set of relevant histories into investment decisions. It can therefore be characterized by a
subset S ⊂ Hb of histories after which a competent firm invests.
As noted in Section 4, the expected return from an investment depends on the outcome
produced in the previous period only. So, for an individual brand, any equilibrium strategy is
a subset of the set {G,∅, B}. We have already discussed two of the 23 = 8 stationary equilib-
ria: the no investment equilibrium that corresponds to the subset S = ∅, which always exists,
and the reputational equilibrium, that corresponds to the subset S = {G,∅, B}. There are
six other candidates for a stationary equilibria S = {G,∅}, {G}, {∅, B}, {B}, {G,B}, and
{∅}.19 Similarly, for collective brands, stationary equilibria can be described by the sets
S = {G,B}, {G}, {B}, and ∅. In the next proposition, we identify which stationary equilib-
18For simplicity, we assume that while a competent firm’s decision whether or not to brand with another
firm may depend on the other firm’s type, after a collective brand is formed, firm’s decisions are independent
of the other firm’s type.
19S = ∅ represents the no investment equilibrium; S = {∅} represents the stationary equilibrium in
which a competent type invests if and only if it failed to match in the previous period and no outcome was
generated.
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ria exist in the case of exclusive knowledge where in addition µ is close to one. Proposition
4 ensures that in this case c̄ind < c̄col.
Proposition 5. Suppose that πL = 0, πH ∈ (0, 1) and µ is sufficiently large (to ensure that
c̄ind < c̄col).
1. If the cost c is such that c > c̄ind, then the “no investment” equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium for an individual brand.20
2. If the cost c is such that c > c̄col, then the “no investment” equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium for a collective brand.
In general, each equilibrium exists under a different set of conditions. However, in the
parameter region that we focus on, where πL = 0, πH ∈ (0, 1), and µ is sufficiently large,
conditions for the existence are very stringent. To understand the intuition for this result,
consider the two equilibria S = {G,∅} and S = {G}. The arguments for other equilibria
are similar. For both equilibria, the firm’s optimal decision following a bad outcome is
not to invest. Knowing this, consumers pay a low price (equal to πL) to a firm that has
produced a bad quality in the previous period. At the same time, a firm that just produced
a good outcome is maximally rewarded with a price equal to πH because it reveals the firm’s
competence. The large difference between the firm’s payoff after bad and good outcomes
implies that a firm would benefit from deviating and investing after a bad history because it
would generate a higher payoff than non investment. Deterring this deviation requires that
the cost of investment c is larger than c̄ind, which is precluded by assumption.
5.2 Profits and Endogenous Brand Formation
Next, we compare the firm’s expected payoff in each equilibrium. In any stationary equi-
librium, the per-period profit is determined by the payoff-relevant history, h ∈ Hb. The
expected profit is the mean per-period profit obtained by averaging over all possible histo-
ries. The probability weight for each outcome is determined by the stationary distribution
that is induced by the equilibrium strategies and beliefs.
Conditional on the history h, consumers facing an individual or collective brand b ∈
{ind, col} update their beliefs that the firm is competent to Prb(C|h). Then, the price the
firm receives depends on the equilibrium strategy of the competent type, which is given by
20If πH is close to 1 and πL ∈ (0, 1) (quality control) and µ is close to 0, then the equilibrium S = {G,∅}
exists if c̄ind < c < c̄col, which is the case if and only if δ < 2πL3+πL , and the equilibrium S = {G} exists if and
only if δ >
2π2L
1+2π2L
. This makes analysis of this case more involved than the case of exclusive knowledge, but
it can nevertheless be analyzed along similar lines.
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the probability that a competent firm invests after history h, denoted σS(h) ∈ {0, 1}. As a
result, the per-period profit conditional on the observed history h is given by:
ΠbS(h) = Pr
b(C|h) · σS(h) · πH + (1− Prb(C|h) · σS(h)) · πL − c · σS(h),
which is equal to the equilibrium probability of producing high quality. So, the mean expected





where Prbs(h) denotes the stationary probability distribution over histories, which is deter-
mined by the brand’s unobserved type s ∈ {C, I}2 and the equilibrium strategy σS . For
example, under the reputational equilibrium, a collective brand produces a history h = GG












, PrcolII (GG) = π
2
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To identify the optimal branding strategy, we compare the expected per-period profits
under the best feasible equilibrium across individual and collective brand.
Proposition 6. Suppose that πL = 0, πH ∈ (0, 1), and µ is sufficiently large to ensure that
c̄ind < c̄col.
1. If the cost c is such that c̄ind < c < c̄col, then a competent firm prefers to form a
collective brand with another firm to establishing its own individual brand, regardless
of the type the other firm.
2. If the cost c is such that 0 < c < c̄ind, then a competent firm prefers to form an
individual brand.
3. If the cost c is such that c > c̄col, then a competent firm is indifferent between an
individual and a collective brand.
Proposition 6 shows that for industries that require exclusive knowledge and have many
competent firms (µ close to 1), the commitment value of a collective brand can induce
competent firms to brand with another firm regardless of its competence. This is the case
for an intermediate level of the investment cost c̄ind < c < c̄col. If c < c̄ind then a competent
firm prefers an individual to a collective brand because in this case, the fact that the former
induces more extreme beliefs turns into an advantage because it also implies higher prices.
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Remark 2. (Quality control) When πH is close to 1 and µ is close to 0, a competent firm
does not want to form a collective brand with an incompetent firm, even if µ is sufficiently
small to guarantee c̄ind < c̄col and c ∈ (c̄ind, c̄col). The reason is that for such costs c, an
individual brand can sustain intermediate equilibria with investment after some histories,
but not all. Such an equilibrium yields higher profits for an individual brand than the more
efficient reputational equilibrium for a collective brand because the firm expects the other
(incompetent) firm to not invest, which will adversely affect consumers’ beliefs and future
prices. Furthermore, for small µ an adverse selection problem arises: since the probability of
a firm being competent is small, consumers’ willingness to pay in a reputational equilibrium
is low because even after good histories their beliefs remain relatively low (more so for a
collective brand). Thus, from an ex-ante perspective, the benefits captured by a competent firm
do not outweigh the investment costs. The formal analysis is relegated to Online Appendix
B.2.
Propositions 6 and Remark 2 imply that in countries with a high baseline reputation (a
large µ) country of origin labeling contributes to social welfare by improving firms’ ability to
commit to invest in quality in industries with exclusive knowledge such as French wine, Swiss
watches, German automobiles, Japanese electronics, US software, etc. In contrast, producers
of generic products such as screws, basic clothes, etc., in such countries should advertise
their own brand only. The exact opposite conclusion applies in countries with a low baseline
reputation (a small µ). In such countries, social welfare is maximized when manufacturers
of generic goods label their country of origin while manufacturers of specialized goods avoid
it.
These theoretical results are consistent with anecdotal evidence. For example the col-
lective brand “Made in China” is advertised by sub-suppliers on platforms such as ‘Made-
in-China.com’,” while successful high-tech companies such as Huawei try to build their own
brand names. On the other hand, German sub-suppliers of generics such as ThyssenKrupp
count on their own brand reputation.
Because firms in “quality control” industries may be reluctant to form a collective brand,
the implementation of the optimal branding strategy might require some government inter-
vention if the baseline reputation of firms is low. Indeed, the regulation of the labeling of
country of origin is an important issue in many countries. The standard argument is that
firms should be required to label their product with certain information in order to provide
better consumer protection. The insights developed here suggest that the type of labeling, in





The intuition for why a collective brand may induce stronger incentives to invest does not
depend on the length of consumers’ memory. In this section, we extend consumers’ memory
to T periods and show that our main results still hold in the following sense: the range of
discount factors δ for which a collective brand provides a stronger incentive to invest than
an individual brand (c̄ind < c̄col) is non-empty for all T . Moreover, as T tends to infinity, it
becomes larger than in the case of a 2−period memory.
In general, with a longer memory, each single investment becomes less important. Thus,
the benefit of a single investment decreases in T both in the case of individual and collective
brands. However, the benefit of investment is more adversely affected for individual brands.
The intuition is identical to that for the 2-period memory. With a longer memory, an
individual brand can reach more extreme reputations following a sequence of good or bad
outcomes, which worsens the associated moral hazard problem.
The following proposition generalizes Proposition 3 to T periods. A detailed analysis and
proofs of the T−period case is relegated to Appendix B.1.
Proposition 7. If πL = 0, πH ∈ (0, 1), and µ is sufficiently close to 1, then a collective
brand sustains a reputational equilibrium for higher investment costs than an individual brand
(c̄ind < c̄col) if the discount factor δ is small enough. Moreover, the region of δ for which
c̄ind < c̄col increases monotonically in T and converges to [0, 1].
Figure 4 exhibits the range of parameters for which a collective brand induces stronger
incentives to invest than an individual brand. For the case of exclusive knowledge, a larger δ
requires a correspondingly larger memory T for a collective brand to outperform an individual
brand. Panel (b) exhibits the analogous result for the case of quality control. While the




In this subsection we generalize the model by allowing for an arbitrary number of firms
n ≥ 3. We maintain the assumptions of a 2-period memory and that the consumer that
arrives in each period is randomly matched with one firm. This implies that the sets of
possible histories are still given by Hind and Hcol, respectively.
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(a) πL = 0 and µ = 1 (b) πH = 1, µ = 0 and πL = 0.8
Figure 4: Region in the T -δ space where ccol > cind (dark) and cind > ccol (light)
The analysis of an individual brand is hence very similar to the analysis with n = 2.
In the collective case, consumers facing a collective brand cannot distinguish between the
identities of individual firms. They care about the expected quality of a randomly matched
firm. Thus, the updating depends on the number of firms and the signal is weaker with
more firms because the consumer knows that she is less likely to have observed the history
of the firm she is matched with. As is the case with n = 2, the reputational equilibrium
exists for a collective brand if and only if the cost of investment is smaller than or equal to a
minimum threshold that describes the expected benefit from investment given histories and
other firms’ types.
Because the benefit of free-riding increases with the number of firms, the benefit of
collective reputation as a commitment device for investment decreases with n. However, as
shown by the next proposition, it is still the case that collective reputation induces stronger
incentives for effort than individual reputation under conditions that are similar to those
described in Proposition 5.
We consider the case of exclusive knowledge where πL = 0 so that one good outcome G
almost fully reveals that the firm is competent. Thus, pind(h) = πH as long as h contains
one G. The reputational equilibrium exists for an individual brand if and only if the cost of
investment c satisfies
c ≤ c̄indn ≡ min
ht−1∈{G,B,∅}
c̄indn (ht−1)
where c̄indn (ht−1) denotes the expected benefit from investment given history ht = ht−2ht−1.
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All in all, Proposition 3 can be generalized as follows:
Proposition 8. Suppose that πL is sufficiently close to 0. A collective brand sustains a
reputational equilibrium for higher investment costs than an individual brand (c̄col > c̄ind)
if consumers’ prior belief µ about the firm’s type is sufficiently high and the discount factor
δ ≤ δ̄ is smaller than or equal to some threshold discount factor δ̄ < 1. The threshold
discount factor δ̄ is decreasing in the number of firms n.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proofs of Section 4
Proof. [Proposition 1] The posterior beliefs µ̂ind about the quality of the product after ob-
serving history ht = ht−2ht−1 are given by Bayes’ rule:
µ̂ind(GG) =
µπ2H
µπ2H + (1− µ)π2L
, µ̂ind(GB) = µ̂ind(BG) =
µπH(1− πH)




µ(1− πH)2 + (1− µ)(1− πL)2
, µ̂ind(G∅) = µ̂(∅G) =
µπH
µπH + (1− µ)πL
µ̂ind(∅∅) = µ, µ̂ind(B∅) = µ̂ind(∅B) =
µ(1− πH)
µ(1− πH) + (1− µ)(1− πL)
.
The reputational equilibrium exists if and only if a competent firm invests whenever visited
following all histories, i.e.,
pind(ht−2ht−1)− c+ δ ·
(
πHV (ht−1G) + (1− πH)V (ht−1B)
)
≥
pind(ht−2ht−1) + δ ·
(
πLV (ht−1G) + (1− πL)V (ht−1B)
)
which is equivalent to
c ≤ cind(ht−1) := δ · (πH − πL) · (V (ht−1G)− V (ht−1B)).



















πHV (BG) + (1− πH)V (BB) + V (B∅)
)
.
Then, the difference is








πH (V (GG)− V (BG))︸ ︷︷ ︸
pind(GG)−pind(GB)
2
+ (1− πH) (V (GB)− V (BB))︸ ︷︷ ︸
pind(GB)−pind(BB)
2






Proof. [Lemma 1] First, note that
pind(GG)− pind(GB) = (πH − πL) ·
(
µπ2H
µπ2H + (1− µ)π2L
− µπH(1− πH)
µπH(1− πH) + (1− µ)πL(1− πL)
)
=
µ(1− µ)πHπL(πH − πL)2
Pr(GG) · Pr(GB)
,
pind(GB)− pind(BB) = (πH − πL) ·
(
µπH(1− πH)
µπH(1− πH) + (1− µ)πL(1− πL)
− µ(1− πH)
2
µ(1− πH)2 + (1− µ)(1− πL)2
)
=




pind(G∅)− pind(B∅) = (πH − πL) ·
(
µπH
µπH + (1− µ)πL
− µ(1− πH)
µ(1− πH) + (1− µ)(1− πL)
)
=
µ(1− µ)(πH − πL)2
Pr(G) · Pr(B)
≥ min{pind(GG)− pind(GB), pind(GB)− pind(BB)}.





⇔ Pr(BB) · πHπL ≤ Pr(GG) · (1− πH)(1− πL)
⇔ πHπL(µ(1− πH)2 + (1− µ)(1− πL)2) ≤ (1− πH)(1− πL)(µπ2H + (1− µ)π2L)
⇔ µπH(1− πH) ≥ (1− µ)πL(1− πL)
This inequality holds if and only if µ ≥ µ̄ ≡ πL(1−πL)
πH(1−πH)+πL(1−πL)
.
Proof. [Proposition 2] Let us denote by V (h; θ) the present discounted expected equilibrium
profit of a competent firm when branding with a θ-type firm after history ht ∈ Hcol at the
beginning of the period before the consumer is assigned to either firm.
Then, a reputational equilibrium exists if and only if for all ht, θ
pcol(ht−2ht−1)− c+ δ ·
(
πHV (ht−1G; θ) + (1− πH)V (ht−1B; θ)
)
≥
pcol(ht−2ht−1) + δ ·
(
πLV (ht−1G; θ) + (1− πL)V (ht−1B; θ)
)
.
This is equivalent to
c ≤ ccol(ht−1) ≡ δ · (πH − πL) · (V (ht−1G; θ)− V (ht−1B; θ)).
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Using this, we can calculate


















(V (GG, θ)− V (BG, θ)) + δ(1− π(θ)))
2
(V (GB, θ)− V (BB, θ))
where π(θ) = πL if θ = I and πH if θ = C.
Proof. [Lemma 2] As noted in Section 3, upon observing a history ht ∈ Hcol, a consumer














































ηII(GG) = 1− ηCC(GG)− 2ηCI(GG),
ηCC(GB) =
µ2πH(1− πH)






(πH(1− πH) + πH(1− πL) + πL(1− πH) + πL(1− πL))
µ2πH(1− πH) + 2µ(1− µ) 14 (πH(1− πH) + πH(1− πL) + πL(1− πH) + πL(1− πL)) + (1− µ)2πL(1− πL)
,
ηII(GB) = 1− ηCC(GB)− 2ηCI(GB),
ηCC(BB) =
µ2(1− πH)2































+ (1− µ)2(1− πL)2
,
ηII(BB) = 1− ηCC(BB)− 2ηCI(BB).
Then, the consumer’s posterior belief is about the firm being competent is given by




and pcol(ht) = (πH − πL)Pr(ht) + πL. Thus, the price differentials are given by:
pcol(GG)− pcol(GB) =
µ(1− µ)(πH − πL)2
(
µ2(πH − πL)2 + 2µ(πH − πL)πL + πL(πH + πL)
)
4 · Pr(GG) · Pr(GB)
pcol(GB)− pcol(BB) =
µ(1− µ)(πH − πL)2
(
µ2(πH − πL)2 − 2µ(πH − πL)(1− πL) + (1− πL)(2− πH − πL)
)
4 · Pr(GB) · Pr(BB)
.
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Thus, pcol(GG)− pcol(GB) < pcol(GB)− pcol(BB) if and only if
µ2(πH − πL)2 + 2µ(πH − πL)πL + πL(πH + πL)
Pr(GG)
<
µ2(πH − πL)2 − 2µ(πH − πL)(1− πL) + (1− πL)(2− πH − πL)
Pr(BB)




(πH − πL)2 − 2(πH − πL)(1− πL) + (1− πL)(2− πH − πL)
(1− πH)2
.
This is equivalent to πL(1 − πH) < πH(1 − πH), i.e., it is always satisfied. Similarly, for




(1− πL)(2− πH − πL)
(1− πL)2
which simplifies to πH < πL which is never satisfied. Thus, by continuity p
col(GG) −
pcol(GB) < pcol(GB)−pcol(BB) for sufficiently large µ and pcol(GG)−pcol(GB) > pcol(GB)−
pcol(BB) for sufficiently small µ. The statement of the proposition follows from the definition
of c̄col(ht−1, θ) in (5).
One can show that unlike in the independent branding case, as µ increases, the binding
history changes from B to G, back to B and then to G, but it does not yield additional
insights, so we omit the proof and statement.
Proof. [Proposition 3] Let us assume that πL is fixed and sufficiently small (or equal to 0).
It follows from Proposition 1 that for µ sufficiently large c̄ind(G) determines the cutoff cost.
Also, by Proposition 2, for sufficiently large µ, c̄col(G;C) determines ccol. Thus, it suffices to
compare cind = cind(G) and ccol = c̄col(G;C).
First, for an individual brand,
lim
πL→0















































For a collective brand,
lim
πL→0





col(GG)− pcol(GB)) + δ(1− πH)(pcol(GB)− pcol(BB))
= δ · πH
2
(1 + δπH) ·
(1− µ)µπH
(1 + µ)(2− (1 + µ)πH)
+δ2 · πH
2
· (1− πH) ·
(1− µ)πH (2− πH(1 + µ(2− µπH)))















ind(G) if and only if 1
2
> δ. Thus,
as long as δ ≤ 1
2
for sufficiently small πL and µ sufficiently close to 1, c
col ≥ cind. Moreover,
limπH→1(1−πH) limπL→0 c̄col(G;C) > limπH→1(1−πH) limπL→0 c̄ind(G) for all δ ∈ [0, 1] if and
only if µ > 1
3
.













which is for example satisfied for any δ ≤ 1 for sufficient large πH .
Proof. [Proposition 4]





















Clearly, δ · 2−πH
2
> δ · 1−πH
2
for all πH ∈ (0, 1). So, for a µ close 0, there is a πL close to 0
such that cind ≥ ccol.
A.2 Proofs of Section 5
Proof. [Proposition 5] This proposition states that, for each branding regime, if the repu-
tational equilibrium does not exist (c > cb), the unique equilibrium is the no investment
equilibrium for b ∈ {ind, col}. This requires of a proof that no other alternative equilibria
exist. For this, we proceed with the following proof strategy. First, we characterize the
conditions under which alternative equilibria (besdies the reputational equilibrium and no
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investment equilibrium) exist for each branding regime. Second, we identify which equilibria
exist if for different values of c, the investment cost.
I. Individual brand: For all equilibria other than the reputational equilibrium and
no investment equilibrium, the competent type sometimes invests and other times not. This
implies the cost of investment cannot be too large or too small. In other words, for an
equilibrium specified by a subset S of Hind = {G,B,∅}, there exist C indS and C indS such that
the equilibrium exists if and only if c ∈ (C indS , C
ind
S ). These cutoff levels are characterized for
each of the six remaining equilibria.
I–1. {G, ∅}− and {G}−Equilibrium
In these equilibria, following a good history, the firm finds it optimal to invest in quality.
On the other hand, following a bad history, it is optimal not to make an investment. Each




ind(GG) + (1− πH)V ind(GB)
)
> pind(xG) + δ
(
πLV






ind(BG) + (1− πH)V ind(BB)
)
< pind(xB) + δ
(
πLV
ind(BG) + (1− πL)V ind(BB)
)
.21 (7)
Following the notation introduced in previous sections, V ind(h) for a history h ∈ {G,B,∅}2
is the equilibrium payoff at the beginning of the period before the consumer is assigned to
either firm. The conditions above are equivalent to
c < δ ·∆π · (V ind(GG)− V ind(GB)). (8)
c > δ ·∆π · (V ind(BG)− V ind(BB)). (9)
(a) Computing Conditions (8) and (9) We express each of V ind(GG) and V ind(GB),
and take their difference, which we denote by A ≡ V ind(GG) − V ind(GB). A competent





















ind(BG) + (1− πL)V ind(BB) + V ind(B∅)
)
.










ind(GG)− V ind(GB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A
) + πL(V
ind(GB)− V ind(BG)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−B
)
+ (1− πL)(V ind(GB)− V ind(BB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0






The underbraces show simplification of expressions in the equation above. Let us denote
V ind(GB) − V ind(BG) = −B. The difference V ind(GB) − V ind(BB) vanishes because both
the period payoff and continuation payoffs are the same.22 V ind(G∅) − V ind(B∅) = 1
2
·
(pind(G∅)− pind(B∅)) because the continuation payoff is the same.
The expression B can be obtained similarly by computing V ind(BG) and V ind(GB) and










ind(GG) + (1− πH)V ind(GB) + V ind(G∅)
)
.










ind(GG)− V ind(GB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A
) + πL(V
ind(GB)− V ind(BG)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−B
)
+ (1− πL)(V ind(GB)− V ind(BB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0

































−2c+ 2(pind(GG)− pind(GB)) + δ(πL · (pind(GG)− pind(BG)) + pind(G∅)− pind(B∅))
2(2− δ ·∆π)
.
Finally, we plug this into the initial condition for incentive compatibility in equation (8)








pind(GG)− pind(GB) + δ
2
(πL(p
ind(GG)− pind(BG)) + pind(G∅)− pind(B∅))
)
(10)
We can repeat a similar exercise and find that Condition (9) corresponds to
























If a firm plays a {G, ∅}-equilibrium, then for a competent type the transition matrix of


























, PrC(∅) = 12 . For an incompetent type, the stationary






, and PrI(∅) = 12 because it never makes an
investment.
Then, the posterior beliefs in this equilibrium, denoted by µ̂ind(h) is obtained by Bayes’





































Since the lower and upper bound coincide in the limit, c has to be arbitrarily close to
δπ2H
2
for S = {G,∅} to be an equilibrium.
















(c) Proof that {G,∅}− and {G}−equilibrium do not exist almost surely. If
c ∈ (cind, ccol), then neither of these equilibria exists for an individual brand. This is because
for πL = 0 and µ close to 1, c
ind and ccol converge to 0. On the other hand, {G,∅}− and




. In other words, these equilibria
require a higher investment cost to exist. This is because an investment is more appealing
in this equilibrium, and only with higher investment cost, the firm can be discouraged from
making an investment following a bad outcome. A good outcome leads to an investment,
which in turn leads to a good outcome. This forms a virtuous circle, which the firm would
want to be part of even if it has produced a bad outcome.
If c > cind, as long as c is bounded away from
δπ2H
2
, neither of {G,∅}− and {G}−equilibrium
would exist. So, we can say these equilibria do not exist almost surely.
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I–2. Proof that {B,∅}− and {B}−equilibrium do not exist.
In these equilibria, a competent firm invests following a bad outcome, but not after a good
outcome. Then, an investment does not yield sufficient future benefits because consumers
punish the firm for having produced a good outcome. This implies that the cutoff levels for
these equilibria would be very small, if not negative.
We can repeat the same analysis to characterize the upper and lower bounds. We find
















Therefore, these equilibria does not exist for any positive investment cost.
I–3. Proof that {G,B}− and {∅}−equilibrium do not exist.
It remains to examine two more equilibria: S = {G,B} and {∅}. These equilibria demon-
strate strategies non-monotonic in the firm’s reputation in the sense that the firm takes
the same action following a good and bad outcome, but a different one following an empty
outcome.
First, for S = {G,B}, the firm must find it optimal to invest following a good and bad
outcome, but not after an ∅-outcome. Then, the equilibrium exists if and only if
δ∆π · (V{G,B}ind(∅G)− V ind{G,B}(∅B)) ≤ c ≤ min
x∈{G,B}
(
δ∆π · (V ind{G,B}(xG)− V ind{G,B}(xB))
)
.
In this equilibrium, the firm behaves the same following a good and a bad outcome. There-
fore, the future payoffs of V ind{G,B}(yG) and V
ind
{G,B}(yB) are exactly the same for any y ∈
{G,B,∅}. So, the difference in these payoff functions is equivalent to the difference in im-
mediate per-period profit. Therefore, the equilibrium can exist for some c > 0 if and only
if






If πL = 0, the right-hand side is zero for x = G, as one good outcome reveals the firm to
be competent. On the other hand, the left-hand side is positive. Therefore, the inequality
cannot hold.
We can similarly show that the S = {∅}−equilibrium does not exist. If it did, the
competent type would invest following an ∅ outcome, but not after a good or bad one. So,





(V ind{∅}(xG)− V ind{∅}(xB)) ≤ c ≤
∆π
2
(V ind{∅}(∅G)− V ind{∅}(∅B)).
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Similarly, comparing the difference in payoff functions is equivalent to comparing that in
prices: maxx∈{G,B} p
ind
{∅}(xG) − pind{∅}(xB) ≤ pind{∅}(∅G) − pind{∅}(∅B). In this equilibrium, the
firm does not invest following a good or bad equilibrium. So, consumers pay the minimal
price, i.e. pind{∅}(yG) = p
ind
{∅}(yB) = πL = 0 for all y ∈ {G,B,∅}. Therefore, both the
left-hand and the right-hand side vanish, and the equilibrium does not exist.
I–4. Statement for Individual Branding
Summing up the previous analysis from I–1 to I–3 above, we conclude that if πL = 0 and µ
is sufficiently large, and if c > cind, the no investment equilibrium is the unique equilibrium
for an individual brand.
This implies that whenever the reputational equilibrium does not exist for an individual
brand, the competent type never makes investment, and consumers pay the minimal price.
This suggests that if c > cind, collective branding would be an attractive option for the firm
as long as it provides more commitment power, i.e., it admits a more profitable equilibrium,
such as the reputational equilibrium.
Next, we move on to collective branding and prove the statement regarding a collective
brand in Proposition 6.
II. Collective brand:
If c > ccol, the reputational equilibrium does not exist. For a collective brand, an equi-
librium is prescribed by S, a subset of Hcol = {G,B}. So, besides the reputational and no
investment equilibrium, there are two alternative equilibria: S = {G}, or {B}. We iden-
tify conditions under which a competent type finds it optimal to follow a given equilibrium
strategy. The payoff of a firm in a collective brand depends on the type of the other firm,
θ ∈ {C, I}. We denote a payoff function at a two-period history h by V colS (h; θ). Whenever
we focus on one specific equilibrium, we omit the notation S.
II–1. {G}−equilibrium
In an equilibrium with S = {G}, following a good history, a firm finds it optimal to invest
in quality, but not following a bad history. Similar to equations (8) and (9), the condition
for existence is
Ccol(θ) ≤ c ≤ Ccol(θ),
where Ccol(θ) := δ ·∆π · (V col(BG; θ)− V col(BB; θ)) and Ccol(θ) := δ ·∆π · (V col(GG; θ)−
V col(GB; θ))
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col(BG;C) + (1− πL)V col(BB;C)
)
.
and hence, for any x, y ∈ {G,B}
V col(xG;C)− V col(yB;C) = p











Thus, we can calculate V (GG)− V (GB) and V (GB)− V (BG) to be
V col(GG)− V col(GB) = p
col(GG)− πL − c+ δπL(pcol(GG)− pcol(BG))
2(1− δ(πH − πL))
V col(BG)− V col(GB) = p
col(BG)− πL − c+ δπH(pcol(GG)− pcol(BG))
2(1− δ(πH − πL))
= V (BG)− V (BB).


















(pcol(GG)− πL) + δπL(pcol(GG)− pcol(BG))
)
















col(BG) + (1− πL)V col(BB)
)
.
and hence, for any x, y ∈ {G,B}
V col(xG)− V col(yB) = p





(V col(GG)− V col(GB))





























(pcol(GG)− πL) + δπL(pcol(GG)− pcol(BG))
)





















(pcol(GG)− πL) + δπL(pcol(GG)− pcol(BG))
)
≡ C{G}col





















In order to calculate the prices we need to calculate the stationary distribution of states
given the transition matrix from the consumer’s perspective. If both firms are competent it









probability of being in state B is PrCC(B) =
1−πH
1−(πH−πL)
. If one is competent and the other


















. If both are incompetent, then PrII(G) = πL
and the probability of being in state B is PrII(B) = 1− πL. Note that as πL → 0, B always
becomes an absorbing state. Hence, the after observing a history GG, a consumer updates




































πL + (1− µ)2π2L













( µ πH1−πH + (1− µ) 11−πH2 πH2
µ πH
1−πH






































































Thus, as for large µ, there is no c > 0 such that a {G}-equilibrium exists.
II–2. {B}−equilibrium
Similarly, one can show that no {B}−equilibrium can exist for sufficiently large µ and πL
close to zero.
Therefore, for πL = 0 and µ close to 1, if c > c
col, the no investment equilibrium is the
unique equilibrium. This proves the proposition.
Proof. [Proposition 6] For c ∈ (cind, ccol), the only equilibrium for an individual brand is
the “no investment” equilibrium by Proposition 5. In this equilibrium, its average prof-
its are given by limµ→1 limπL→0 Π
ind ≈ πL ≈ 0. In a collective brand, regardless of the
other firm’s competency, the firm’s average profit in a reputation equlibrium is given by
limµ→1 limπL→0 Π
col = πH − c. Therefore, the firm always prefers branding with another firm
to staying alone as long as c < πH with is the case by assumption.
For c ∈ (0,min{cind, ccol}), the reputational equilibrium exists for an individual and
collective brand. Thus, after any history, consumers expect competent firms to invest, but
the belief updating after a particular history is different. An individual firm makes an average
37
profit of
Πind = 0.25 ·
(
π2Hp
ind(GG) + 2 · πH(1− πH)pind(GB) + (1− πH)2pind(BB)+
2 · πHpind(G∅) + 2 · (1− πH)pind(B∅) + pind(∅∅)
)
− c
A competent firm forms a brand with another competent firm makes an average profit of
Πcol = π2Hp
col(GG) + πH(1− πH)pcol(GB) + πH(1− πH)pcol(BG) + (1− πH)2pcol(BB)− c.








π3H(πH(πH((0.125πH − 0.5)πH + 0.75)− 0.5) + 0.125)
(1− πH)6
> 0.
Thus, for large µ, a firm always prefers to stay alone to branding with another firm. Note that
branding with an incompetent firm is always less attractive than branding with a competent
firm.
When c > ccol > cind, only the no-investment equilibrium exist for a collective brand, as
well as an individual brand. Thus, the average profit in both scenarios is πL = 0.
A.3 Proof of Section 6.1
Please see the online appendix for proof of Proposition 7.
A.4 Proof of Section 6.2
Proof. [Proposition 2] Note that the history that must minimizes the benefit from investment
is ht−1 = GG and






µ(1− πH)2 + 1− µ
+ (N − 1) · 1− µ
µ(1− πH) + 1− µ
]
.













In the collective case, for πL ≈ 0 the probability of facing a C-firm after a history h with u













































This equation is Bayes’ rule. The denominator is the total probability that a history h is
produced. Provided that i of N firms are competent, the second summation is the probability
that u good and 2− u bad outcomes are produced. With πL = 0, only competent type can




)v · πuH · (1− πH)v−u is the probability that a competent type is
drawn v ≥ u times and produce u good and v − u bad outcomes. The remaining 2− v bad




. Summing this over i gives the total probability. On the numerator is simply a joint
probability that the collective brand produces h and a randomly drawn firm is competent.
Therefore, there has to exist at least one competent type, which is represented in the lower
bound i = 1 in the first sum. An additional factor of i
N
in the second summation completes
the expression.













































































































































































































































































(Prcol(C|GB)− Prcol(C|BB)) = N + πH −NπH
N2(1− πH)2
























δ(N − 1 + δN)π2H
N3(1− πH)


















δπ2H (2(N − 1)− δN(N2 − 2))
2N3(1− πH)




B.1 Appendix: T−Period Memory Analysis and Proofs
In this section, we extend our analysis to a T -period memory for T > 2. With a T−period
memory, a relevant history at period t is of the form ht ∈ Hind := {G,∅, B}TT for an
individual brand and ht ∈ HcolT := {G,B}T for a collective brand. The history consists of
outcomes produced in the previous T periods, ht = ht−Tht−T+1 · · ·ht−1. As time proceeds,
consumers’ new history consists of the most recent outcomes from ht and new outcomes.
Let us denote the n most recent outcomes by hnt = ht−n · · ·ht−1 for any 1 ≤ n ≤ T .
As in Section 4, we start by finding conditions under which the reputational equilibrium
exists for an individual and a collective brand. Then, we compare the respective parameter
regions to find where the equilibrium exists under a collective, but not under an individual
brand. The analysis is similar to that in Section 4, so to avoid redundancy, we omit details.
B.1.1 Individual brand
In a reputational equilibrium, a competent firm must find it optimal to invest after any
history. To rule out profitable deviations, we consider the firm’s investment decision at
period t (also often referred as today) given that the firm will invest whenever visited in the
future. By investing, it can add ht = G to the history ht with a greater probability, which
will be remembered in the next T periods. k + 1 periods after period t, consumers would









The new outcomes are denoted by htr
k
t+k+1, where ht is the result of today’s investment
decision. To simplify the notation and to distinguish the known (old) outcomes and those
to be realized, we denote future outcomes rkt+k+1. Then, conditional on realizing the future
outcomes f, the benefit of investing in period t comes from a probabilistic improvement in













t+k+1). The total expected benefit from a decision
to invest today then is a sum of such price differences, weighted according to the probability
of realizing rkt+k+1 and accounting for an appropriate discounting.
So, we can compute the benefit of an investment for each history. Then, the reputational
equilibrium exists if and only if the cost of investment is less than the minimum of benefits
over all histories. We summarize this in the next lemma, which is a general statement of
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Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. For an individual brand, there exists a constant cind > 0 such that the reputatoinal












Pr(f)(p(hT−k−1t Gf)− p(hT−k−1t Bf))
)
. (13)
Proof. As in Lemma 1, we obtain an expression for the cutoff in terms of price differences.
Let V (ht) be the expected payoff to the firm in equilibrium:




· V ind(hT−1t G) +
1− πH
2
· V ind(hT−1t B) +
1
2
· V ind(hT−1t ∅)
)
.
As the consumer visits the firm with probability 1
2
, the firm’s expected period-t profit is
1
2
(p(ht) − c). The expected future payoff depends on the realized outcome in the current







Once the firm is visited, it should be optimal for the firm to invest always. Given a history
ht and a consumer’s visit, the expected payoff from following the equilibrium strategy is
p(ht)− c+ δ(πH · V ind(hT−1t G) + (1− πH) · V ind(hT−1t B)). (14)
By deviating and not investing today, the firm expects to obtain the following payoff
p(ht) + δ(πL · V ind(hT−1t G) + (1− πL) · V ind(hT−1t B)).
By investing in quality, the firm is able to produce a good outcome with a greater proba-
bility πH , which improves the future payoffs. Then, the condition for the existence of the
reputational equilibrium can be expressed as a cutoff-rule; the invest cost is always less than
its benefit. So,
c ≤ cind := δ ·∆π · min
hT−1t ∈{G,∅,B}T−1
∆V ind(hT−1t ), (15)
where ∆V ind(hT−1t ) := V
ind(hT−1t G)−V ind(hT−1t B). The firm is able to receive a higher price
in the next T periods due to the good outcome produced today. For this reason, ∆V (hT−1t )
is a present-discounted weighted-sum of price premiums, as we saw in the analysis for two-
period memory:
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The future payoff, conditional on producing a good outcome, is






























































Given a history hT−1t G, the relevant history k periods later becomes h
T−k−1Gf . That is,
consumers replace oldest k memories with a new memory realized throughout k periods, i.e.,
f ∈ Hk. Conditional on the realization of f , the firm’s period-profit is p(hT−k−1Gf)−c. This
realization occurs with a probability denoted by Pr(f). Accouting for these probabilities and
discounting, we obtain the first double sum in the equation. Once T periods have passed
and consumers no longer remember the good outcome of the investment made in period
t, the firm’s relevant history can be any T−period history, g ∈ HindT . So, we obtain the
second double sum by weighting and discounting each period-profit appropriately. The firm
receives a period-profit if and only if the consumer visits, and therefore we divide the whole
expression by 2.
To compute Pr(f), counting the number of good, bad and empty histories is just enough,
as the order of each outcome does not matter. Let Nh(ht) for h ∈ {G,B,∅} and ht ∈ HindT
be the count of an outcome of type h in the T -period history ht. For example, NG(G∅G) =
2, NB(G∅G) = 0 and N∅(G∅G) = 1. Suppose NG(f) = i, NB(f) = j, and N∅(f) = l,






)l. The next two lines
in the equation are results of simply plugging in these probabilities.
Likewise, the future payoff to the firm if it produced a bad outcome would be












































Therefore, subtracting the two gives
























Plugging this into (15) completes the proof.
To obtain an explicit expression for cind, we need to uncover the minimum operator by
identifying the binding history for different parameter regions. As in the two-period memory
case, we focus on two special signal structures: exclusive knowledge (πL = 0) and quality
control (πH = 1). The former provides an environment where building an extremely high
level of reputation is easy for a competent firm, as one good outcome completely reveals
its type. Therefore, we can attain the minimum by choosing a history that has a lasting
damage to the firm’s incentives. This implies that any history hT−1t with ht−1 = G does the
job. Since the most recent outcome in the history is good, consumers know perfectly the
firm’s type to be good until t = T − 1. This eliminates all the benefits to be realized until
period t+ T − 1. The only expression that survives in equation (13) is the very last period
(t+T ) when ht−1 = G will have been forgotten. As this benefit is discounted by δ
T , a longer
history clearly hurts investment incentives for an individual brand.
Under the structure of quality control (πH = 1), one bad outcome completely reveals
a firm to be an incompetent type. Then, similarly, any history with ht−1 = B attains the
minimum because it puts a bad stamp on the brand for until period t + T − 1. Then, all
benefits other than ones to be realized in the very last period (t + T ), again discounted by
δT .
Therefore, limπL→0 c
ind = limπL→0 c̄
ind(ht) where ht−1 = G, and limπH→1 c
ind = limπH→1 c̄
ind(gt)
where gt−1 = B. We state next lemma with characterization of the cutoff once we take limits
for µ.
Lemma 4. (i) In an the environment with exclusive knowledge (πL = 0), a history in which











(ii). In an environment with quality control (πH = 1), a history in which the most recent














Proof. First, the binding constraints are identified. Second, the cutoff-level is computed. As
the exact cutoff level involves a minimum operator, we need to compare ∆V (hT−1t ) for all
hT−1t ∈ {G,B,∅}.
First, suppose πL = 0, πH ∈ (0, 1). This is the case of exclusive technology where a good
outcome reveals the firm to be competent. So, µ(h) = 1 if and only if NG(h) ≥ 1. Here, the
price p(h) = πH · µ(h). So,
p(hT−1−kGf)− p(hT−1−kBf) = πH · (µ(hT−1−kGf)− µ(hT−1−kBf))
= πH · (1− µ(hT−1−kBf)).
This vanishes if and only if NG(h
T−1−kBf) ≥ 1, i.e. there is at least one good outcome in
this history. To find a history that minimizes ∆V (·), we want as many of the price difference
as possible to vanish. For this purpose, it suffices to have ht−1 = G. Recall ht−1 is the
outcome produced a period before the focal investment decision. So, the good outcome
reveals the firm’s competence until it is forgotten T periods later. So, with ht−1 = G,
p(hT−1−kGf) − p(hT−1−kBf) = 0 for all f ∈ {G,B,∅}k for 0 ≤ k ≤ T − 2. For k = T − 1,








That is, all benefits other than the one realized in the last period vanish. And, this part is
independent of h, the history at the time of investment decision. Therefore, h−1 = G indeed
attains the minimum for ∆V (·).
Clearly, p(Gf)− p(Bf) vanishes for any NG(f) ≥ 1. Therefore, terms that survive in the
























































µ(1− πH)j+1 + (1− µ)
 .
The first equality holds because µ̂(GBj∅T−1−j) = 1 because a good history causes a full
revelation, and µ̂(Bj+1∅T−1−j) = µ(1−πH)
j+1
µ(1−πH)j+1+1−µ
. Simply plugging into (15) proves the lemma






Now, consider the case where πH = 1 and πL ∈ (0, 1). Here, a bad outcome is revealing
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of a firm’s incompetence. Therefore, µ(h) = 0 if and only if NB(h) ≥ 1, and p(h) = πL. We
omit details for this case, as it is very similar to the previous case.
From equation (16), ht−1 = B attains the minimum for ∆V
ind(·). Then, all price premi-




















































· (1 + πL
πL
)T−1. (18)
As we see in equations (16) and (17), the expected benefit to be realized in the last
period is a weighted sum, depending on realization of f, the future outcomes following the
focal investment decision at period t. The price differences are of the form pind(Gf)−pind(Bf),
where f ∈ {G,∅, B}T−1. Under πL = 0, if any outcome in f is G, the difference vanishes,
as one good outcome reveals the firm to be competent. So, the summation accounts for the
cases where f ∈ {∅, B}T−1, i.e. only bad or empty outcomes constitute f. Likewise, under
πH = 1, the price difference vanishes if and only if there is a B in f. So, (17) sums over the
cases f ∈ {G,∅}T−1.
B.1.2 Collective brand
A longer memory also makes a collective brand to reach a higher level of reputation by
producing good outcomes, which makes it hard for firms in the group to further exert a
costly investment. However, as we saw in the analysis of the main model with a two-period
memory, consumers’ limited observability for a collective brand alleviates this problem; as
consumers cannot observe history at firm-level, they can never learn perfectly about the
types of two firms in the group. Therefore, a competent firm can always improve the brand
reputation by investing in quality.
The relevant history for a collective brand with T−period memory is ht ∈ HcolT =
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{G,B}T . The next lemma establishes the necessary and sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of reputational equilibrium. Let θ ∈ {C, I} denote the other firm’s type. Pr(f ; θ) for
f ∈ {G,B}k and θ ∈ {C, I} with 0 ≤ k ≤ T is the the probability that the brand produces
a sequence of outcomes f in k periods if a competent firm always invests.
Lemma 5. For a competent firm within a collective brand, there exists a constant ccol > 0
such that the reputational equilibrium exists if and only if c ≤ ccol where
ccol = min
hT−1t ,θ













where hT−1t ∈ {G,B}T−1 and θ ∈ {C, I}.
Proof. As this lemma is a straightforward generalization of lemma 2, we omit many details.
Also, we adopt notation from the proof for 3. Let V colθ (ht) denote the payoff to a competent
firm of a collective brand before the customer’s visit. The brand can be one of types s ∈
{CC,CI}.
V colθ (ht) ≡
1
2
(p(ht)− c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
current period profit
+δ
πH + π(θ)2 · V colθ (hT−1t G) + (1− πH + π(θ)2 ) · V colθ (hT−1t B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
continuation payoff
 .
In the current period the firm makes p(ht)− c if visited and 0 otherwise. In the next period,
the brand will face a history hT−1t G or h
T−1
t B depending on today’s investment outcome,
which also depends on the type of the other firm. So, on average, the firm produces a G
with a probability πH+π(θ)
2
and a B otherwise.
Once the firm is visited, it should be optimal for the firm to invest always. After a history
ht, by following the equilibrium strategy, the firm expects to receive
p(ht)− c+ δ(πH · V colθ (hT−1t G) + (1− πH) · V colθ (hT−1t B))
The firm’s expected payoff from a deviation is
p(ht) + δ(πL · V colθ (hT−1t G) + (1− πL) · V colθ (hT−1t B)).
This is equivalent to






where ∆V colθ (h
T−1




t G)− V colθ (hT−1t B).












































Pr(g; θ)(p(g)− c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
After T Periods
In each period, the brand produces a G with a probability πH+π(θ)
2
and a B with the com-
plementary probility. Therefore, for any ht ∈ Hcol, if NG(ht) = i and NB(ht) = j = t − i,





































Plugging this into (20) completes the proof.
This lemma generalizes lemma 2. The cutoff now depends on the type of the other firm,
as it affects realization of future outcomes f through Pr(f; θ). Also, prices here are different
from those in the individual brand because conditional on a history, posterior beliefs are
different.
First, in the exclusive knowledge case, πL = 0 and µ close to 1. Then, a good outcome
is informative. However, the informativeness of each additional good outcome must be
decreasing. For example, having one good outcome compared to none is quite desirable, as
it reveals the existence of at least one competent firm. But, having a fifth good outcome in
the history in addition to existing four is not as valuable, as consumers already believe with
a high probability that both firms are competent. So, in this parameter region, the binding
constraint would be provided by an environment that produces as many good outcomes as
possible. Naturally, hT−1t = G
T−1 and θ = C would do the job.
Second, in quality control, πH = 1 and µ close to 0. Then, while a bad outcome is
informative, it’s informativeness decreases as there are more bad outcomes in the history.
So, the binding condition would be provided by hT−1t = B
T−1 and θ = I, as together they
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produce as many bad outcomes as possible in the brand’s history.
Then, we can compute the cutoff levels explicitly:
Lemma 6. (i) Under the environment of exclusive technology (πL = 0), if µ is close to 1,














(ii) Under the quality control (πH = 1), if µ is close to 0, c





















Proof. The exact cutoff levels in lemma 5 is a discounted sum of price premiums over T
periods. It is not feasible to obtain an explicit expression for general parameter regions.
We find it useful to understand posterior beliefs denoted by η(·). Facing a collective brand,
consumers update beliefs over types of the brand, s ∈ {CC,CI, IC, II}, and use this to
compute the probability of visiting a competent firm: η(·) = ηCC(·) + 12(ηCI(·) + ηIC(·)). So,
η(ht), if NG(ht) = i, is
η(ht) =









)T−i + (1− µ)2 · πiL(1− πL)T−i
(24)
It is infeasible to obtain an explicit expression for ∆Vθ(·), not to mention the overall cutoff,
c̄col. As we did in previous analyses, we i) focus on two signal structures (πL = 0 vs. πH = 1),
ii) identify the binding history and the brand type, and iii) obtain the cutoff level.
First, consider the case πL = 0. Then, after a history ht, the consumer pays p(ht) = η(ht)·
πH . The reputational benefit realized in each period is the price difference made available
by one more good outcome in the history, and thus is of a form p(hT−1−kGf)−p(hT−1−kBf),
where NG(h
T−1−kGf) = NG(h
T−1−kBf) + 1. And, here we claim that this difference is
decreasing in i for a large enough µ. That is, when πL = 0 and µ is large, the price premium
reduces as the number of good outcomes becomes large. If this were true, hT−1t = G
T−1 and
θ = C would provide the minimum for ∆Vθ(h
T−1
t ), as these two conditions both places the
brand under histories with more good outcomes. We formally state this and prove:
Claim 1. Suppose πL = 0 and µ is close to 1. Let r1, r2 ∈ HcolT such that NG(r1) = i+ 1
and NG(r2) = i. Then, p(r1)− p(r2) is decreasing in i. So, hT−1t = GT−1 and θ = C attains
the minimum for ∆Vθ(h
T−1
t ), and hence are the binding condition for the cutoff level, c̄
col.
The intuition is the following. As long as there is a good outcome in the history, con-
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sumers believe the brand has either one or two competent firms. But, as they see more good
outcomes, they become more convinced that both firms are competent. As more good out-


















































































which is clearly decreasing in i. Therefore, for any positive integer T , there is a µ̄ close
enough to 1 so that, for any µ > µ, the difference in beliefs (and thus prices) is decreasing
in i, the number of good outcomes in the history. This completes the proof for the claim.

























































Next, we consider the case πH = 1. Then, the price consumer pays after a history ht
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is p(ht) = η(ht) + (1 − η(ht))πL. In this setting, a bad outcome is very informative, as it
reveals existence of an incompetent firm in the brand. And, intuitively as there are more bad
outcomes in the history, informativeness of each bad outcome decrease. Therefore, the price
premium to be realized k period after the focal investment decision conditional on the new
outcomes f is p(hT−1−kGf)−p(hT−1−kBf), and this decreases in i, where i = NG(hT−1−kBf).
We state it formally in the next claim.
Claim 2. Suppose πH = 1 and µ is close to 0. And let NG(h
T−1−kBf) = i. Then,
p(hT−1−kGf) − p(hT−1−kBf) is increasing in i. Then, hT−1t = BT−1 and θ = I attains the
minimum for ∆Vθ(h
T−1






µ2 + µ(1− µ) · (1+πL
2
)T
µ2 + 2µ(1− µ) · (1+πL
2













)T−i + (1− µ)2 · πiL(1− πL)T−i
Then, limπH→1(η(r1)− η(r2)) =









)T−i−1 + (1− µ)2 · πi+1L (1− πL)T−i−1
−









)T−i + (1− µ)2 · πiL(1− πL)T−i
Then, taking η(r1)−η(r2)
µ

























This is clearly increasing in i. Therefore, there is a µ̄πH=1 close enough to 0 so that the
difference in beliefs (and thus prices) is increasing in i, the number of good outcomes in the
history. This completes the proof for the claim.
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Even in the limits, benefits of investment for a collective brand do not vanish, and the
cutoff turns out to be a sum of what turns out to be a finite geometric sequence. Unlike the
cutoff for an individual brand, the cutoff is not discounted by δT , so it decreases in T as a
much slower rate. This highlights the advantage of collective brands over individual ones.
B.1.3 Comparing Individual and Collective Brands
It remains to prove the statement in Proposition 7, in particular the conditions under which
ccol is greater than cind. We compare the cutoff levels obtained in euqations (16) and (22),
and (17) and (23).
Proof. [Proposition 7] For the good news case with πL = 0, we compare the cutoff levels we
















⇔ δ · 1− (2δ)
T
1− 2δ
> (2δ)T . (26)
If δ < 1
2
, this condition is equivalent to δ
1−2δ >
(2δ)T
1−(2δ)T . This holds true for every T ≥ 2.
This is because when T = 2, δ
1−2δ >
(2δ)2
1−(2δ)2 if and only if δ < 1/2. Also, the right-hand side
is decreasing in T for δ < 1/2.
If δ > 1
2





(2δ)T−1 . We can define f(x, T ) =
xT
xT−1 ,
which is decreasing in xT . For x > 1, xT is increasing both in x and T . The condition above
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can be re-written as 1
2
· f(2δ, 1) > f(2δ, T ). Therefore, the inequality is more likely to hold
for a larger T . Also, 1
2
· f(2δ, 1) − f(2δ, T ) is decreasing in δ. Therefore, there exists δ(T )
such that the condition holds if and only if δ < δ(T ). Greater T expands the scope of this
inequality, and therefore δ(T ) increases in T .
For the case with πH = 1, we compare limµ→0 limπH→1
∆V ind(BT−1)
µ





(25), and a collective brand sustains the reputational equilibrium

































> (δ · 1 + πL
πL
)T−1 (27)
Because the left-hand side is always increasing in T , (27) is more likely to hold if δ(1+πL)
πL
≤
1. Otherwise, if δ(1+πL)
πL
> 1, the right-hand side diverges as T goes to infinity. So, in order
for the condition to hold, the left-hand side must diverge at a faster rate. The left-hand side
converges if and only if δ < 2πL
1+3πL
. So, if πL
1+πL
< δ < 2πL
1+3πL
, the condition holds only for a
small enough T . If δ > 2πL
1+3πL
, we can show that the condition cannot hold for T too large.
B.2 Appendix: Proofs for the Quality Control Case
This section proves claims made in the paper regarding the quality control case, i.e. πH = 1.
In this environment, a competent type always produces a good outcome if it exerts investment
efforts. An incompetent type can sometimes can sometimes produce a good outcome, and
other times a bad outcome, i.e. πL ∈ (0, 1). So, upon producing a bad outcome, the firm’s
type to be incompetent.
We prove the following statement that corresponds to Remark 1:
Proposition 9. (Remark 1) Suppose πH = 1 so that a bad outcome reveals a firm’s incom-
petence. If µ is sufficiently close to 0, then ccol > cind if and only if δ is not too large. If µ
is sufficiently close to 1, then ccol < cind.
Proof. Here, set πH = 1 and 0 < πL < 1. It follows from Lemma 1 that c
ind = cind(B).
Similarly, ccol = ccol(B; I) for high and low values of µ.
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(pind(GB)− pind(BB)) + δ
2
(pind(GG)− pind(GB) + pind(G∅)− pind(B∅))
=










δ(1− πL)2 · µ
4
· Y ind(µ, πL).










· ((1 + πL) · (pcol(GG)− pcol(GB)) + (1− πL)(pcol(GB)− pcol(BB)))
=
δ(1− πL)2 · µ
4
· Y col(µ, πL)





To make a comparison for µ close to 0, it is sufficient to compare Y ind and Y col in that region:
lim
µ→0





Y col(µ, πL) =
2πL + δ(1 + 3πL)
4π2L
So, limµ→0 Y
col > limµ→0 Y
ind if and only if δ < 2πL
3+πL
. Thus, by continuity, if πH = 1 and µ
is close to 0, ccol ≥ cind for δ < 2πL
3+πL
.
On the other hand, if µ is close to 0, cind ≥ ccol holds always because
lim
µ→1
Y ind(µ, πL) = 2δ > lim
µ→1




for all values of πL. Therefore, for πH = 1 and µ close to 0, an individual brand sustains the
reputational equilibrium better.
Proposition 10. (Remark 2) Suppose πH = 1. Then, c
ind < ccol for all sufficiently small µ if
and only if δ < 2πL
3+πL
. In that case, for µ close to 0 and c ∈ (cind, ccol), the {G,∅}−equilibrium
always exists for an individual brand. The {G}−equilibrium exists for all sufficiently small
µ if and only if
2π2L
1+2πL
< δ < 2πL
3+πL
.
Proof. Now consider the region where πH = 1 and µ is close to 0. We already ruled out
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existence of two equilibria: S = {G,B}, and {∅}. We now show that, for cind < c < ccol,
{B,∅}− and {B}−equilibrium do not exist, by verifying C indS < cind. (Recall an equilibrium
S exists if and only if C indS < c < C
ind
S .)






δ2µ(1− πL)3(1 + πL)













cind = δµ(1− πL)2 ·
δ(πL(1 + πL) + µ(2− πL − π2L))






{B,∅} = δµ(1− πL)2 ·
δ(1− πL)






{B} = δµ(1− πL)2 ·
δ(1− πL)(1 + πL)
4(µ(1− πL)2 + (3− πL)πL
.
To compare these values close for µ close to 0, each of these expressions is divided by µ and
taken to limit for µ→ 0. Then, the limit is:
cind
µ





























, which proves the non-
existence of {B,∅}− and {B}−equilibria.
Next, we show the existence of two equilibria, S = {G} and {G,∅} in the relevant
parameter region. We show this by showing that, in that region, the interval (CS , CS)













δ(1− µ)(2− πL)(1 + πL) + 2(πL + π2L + µ(2− πL − π2L))
4(1− (1− µ)πL)(πL(1 + πL) + µ(2− πL − π2L))
=










(4 + (1− µ)πL(4 + δ(2− πL)(1 + πL)))
4(1− (1− µ)πL)(πL(1 + πL) + µ(2− πL − π2L))
=
















































2πL + δ(1 + 3πL)
16π2L
.
Recall that we are focusing on the case that ccol > cind, i.e., δ < 2πL
3+πL
. Now we check the
existence of equilibrium S = {G,∅} and {G} by comparing (CS , CS) and (cind, ccol).
First, ccol < C
ind
{G,∅} and c
ind > C ind{G,∅} for all values of δ and πL, so (c
ind, ccol) ⊂
(C{G,∅}, C{G,∅}). This implies that whenever c ∈ (cind, ccol), the {G,∅}−equilibrium ex-
ists whenever δ < 2πL
3+πL
.
Furthermore, ccol < C
ind
{G} holds whenever δ <
2πL
3+πL
. In contrast, cind > C
ind
{G} holds if and
only if δ >
2π2L
1+2πL




< δ < 2πL
3+πL
.
We have shown that a S = {G,∅}-equilibrium always exists for sufficiently small µ as long
as δ < 2πL
3+πL
. If a firm plays a {G,∅}-equilibrium, then for a competent type the transition
matrix of the Markov chain from the previous outcome ht−1 ∈ {G,∅, B} to ht ∈ {G,∅, B}




























, and PrI(∅) = 12 because it never makes an investment.
Then, the posterior beliefs in this equilibrium, denoted by µ̂ind(h) is obtained by Bayes’





, µ(∅∅) = µ and µ(GG) = µ
µ+(1−µ)π2L
. We can write the profit of a competent firm










































0.125π4L(πL(πL(3.5− 2.5πL) + 0.5)− 1.5)
π6L
< 0.
Thus, as πH is close to 1 a collective firm prefers to play an {G,∅}-equilibrium to a
reputation equilibrium even though it is socially optimal to form a collective brand. Note that
for πH = 1 individual and collective brands are equally efficient from a welfare perspective.
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